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HUNGARY 
AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE-HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
1. CHINESE-HUNGARIAN TRADE RELATIONS
1 The Eastern Opening Policy’s objective was to reduce the dependency of Hungary’s economy on trade with the West, particularly with European Union member states, through inc-
reased commerce with countries in the East, particularly China. 
2 Éltető A - Szunomár Á: Chinese investment and trade – strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 4:(1) 
pp. 24-48, 2016 (available at https://iises.net/international-journal-of-business-management/publication-detail-434) 
Over the past decade and a half, Hungary has committed itself to the 
development of relations with China. Budapest has become open to many 
types of cooperation with Beijing. Although the Hungarian political arena 
is rather divided, Sino-Hungarian relations enjoy a privileged position on 
all major parties’ agendas. No matter how fierce the domestic political 
debates are, none of the parties question the importance of China for 
Hungary. Besides promoting economic relations with China, the Hungarian 
government has been rhetorically supporting China on many sensitive 
issues, such as lifting the arms embargo and granting market economy 
status to the country, in the context of WTO trade agreements. It has played 
an even more active role in the South China Sea issue and the One Belt, One 
Road initiative. In return, Hungary indeed occupies a disproportionately 
significant profile in China given its overall geopolitical importance.
The Hungarian government’s desire has long been to serve as a gateway 
or hub for China from which to access the whole of Europe. It considers 
relations with China to be of great significance, where besides the 
development of bilateral investment and trade relations Hungary would 
also like to become a part of one of the main transit routes of Chinese 
goods targeting the European market.
Although the Hungarian Government’s Eastern Opening policy1 has 
accelerated economic relations between China and Hungary, this opening 
process began well before the official announcement of the strategy in 
2012. For example, in 2004, the Hungarian consulate in Shanghai was 
reopened, and in 2010 a new consulate was opened in Chongqing. Some 
organizations such as the Hungarian-Chinese Economic Chamber and the 
Chinese-Hungarian Business Committee have been established to intensify 
bilateral business relations, as well. In addition, for some years Hungary 
has been developing its relations with China in a multilateral forum. The 
first China-CEE Economic and Trade Forum was held in Budapest in June 
2011 and since the annual 16+1 cooperation forum was established in 
2013, the Hungarian government meets with its Chinese counterparts at 
the highest level every year at the 16+1 summits.2
Regarding trade relations, China is one of Hungary’s most important 
trading partners. Chinese trade volumes have steadily increased over the 
last one and a half decades, particularly after 2004 (Hungary’s accession 
date to the EU), declined slightly as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 
than increased again from 2009. Although trade relations are indeed on 
the rise, it has to be emphasized that the vast majority (around 80%) 
of Hungary’s export still targets the countries of the European Union, 
mainly Germany (25-30%) and Hungary’s export to China represents 
less than 5% of the total. Similarly, a bit less than 80% of Hungary’s 
imports come from the EU, with more than 25% from Germany alone, 






















Figure 1. Trade between China and Hungary, 2000-2016, million USD
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3 Éltető A - Toporowski, P: Global value chains - shaping trade between Visegrad Countries and Asia. Europe-Asia Studies, 2013 (available at www.etsg.org/etsg2013/Papers/297.pdf)
4 Éltető, A - Szunomár Á: Trade and investment between the Visegrad and East Asian countries with a special emphasis on China and Hungary. In: Antal J (ed.) Small states - big chal-
lenges: the experience of the EU and Visegrad region. Prague: Nakladatelství Oeconomica , 2015. pp. 79-95.
5 Éltető A - Toporowski, P: Global value chains - shaping trade between Visegrad Countries and Asia. Europe-Asia Studies, 2013 (avalable at www.etsg.org/etsg2013/Papers/297.pdf) 
Certainly, the European Union has a dominant role in the trade of the 
CEE countries, including Hungary. The share of Asian countries is much 
smaller, but their role has increased during recent years: increases in trade 
with Asia have shown stronger growth than with the EU or other non-EU 
regions.3 The weight of Asian trade volumes is generally more significant in 
imports than in exports of CEE countries, including Hungary. Asian trade 
dynamics are largely determined by trade with China, which has become 
Hungary’s most important partner in Asia. In recent years, China’s share 
in Hungary’s export destinations increased but the increase is even more 
significant in imports. 
Hungarian exports to China are partly dominated by engines since the 
mid-2000s, although their share in exports has been decreasing recently 
(the export share of engines used to be between 28 and 40% for years, 
but started to decrease after 2014; now it is less than 10% of exports to 
China). One possible reason for this decrease is that the Hungarian 
affiliate of the Volkswagen Group (Audi Hungaria) sharply decreased its 
delivery of engines to the Chinese affiliate of the VW Group. This decrease 
affected the total amount of Hungarian exports to China. At the same time, 
transport vehicles, especially cars and parts of motor vehicles, are gaining 
an increasing share in the export mix since 2014, and are now above 30%. 
Electronics (electrical transformers and other apparatus) represent the 
third most important export category of Hungary to China: a bit less than 
15% of Hungarian export comes from this category.
In the past few years the export of agricultural products to China gained 
a certain impetus. Chinese authorities usually undertake a long period 
for examination before allowing such products into the Chinese market. 
Hungary received permission to export beef (being the first in the EU, 
although there is no significant delivery so far) and milk products (being 
third after Poland and Bulgaria) and more and more firms are permitted 
to export pork too. 
On the import side, the leading product group for several CEE countries 
is electronics, mainly telecommunication equipment (telephones, 
transmission apparatus and relating spare parts). This is also the most 
significant product category for Hungarian imports from China, taking up 
60-70% of the total for several years. In recent years it is between 50-55%. 
The second most important product category is machinery, especially LCD 
televisions and computers, taking up to around 25% in recent years.
The pattern of trade between China and CEE has changed somewhat in 
the last decade. In certain cases, volumes increased and in other areas 
they decreased. These structural changes generally resulted in the increase 
share of high-tech goods in trade in certain CEE countries. The volume 
and overall share of high-tech exports to China has been the highest in the 
case of Hungary. In general, the CEE-China trade is much more high-tech 
intensive than the CEE-EU trade.4
The high technology intensity of trade is mainly due to the aforementioned 
large flows of automotive, electronics and telecommunications products. 
This is based on the activity of multinational companies in the global 
production networks.5 The bulk of foreign trade between Hungary and 






















(multinational) companies. Because the volume of trade is relatively small 
(compared to for example trade with the EU or specifically Germany), one 
decision of a global company concerning relocation or change in internal 
deliveries among affiliates can significantly change the trade volumes 
6 Chen X: Trade and economic cooperation between China and CEE countries. Working Paper Series on European studies, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 2., 2012
of a given country vis-á-vis China. Relocating plants from Hungary, for 
example, decreased Hungarian export capacity to Asia significantly in 
2012-13.
2. CHINESE-HUNGARIAN INVESTMENT RELATIONS
Hungary’s Eastern opening policy doesn’t concentrate only on developing 
trade relations and economic opportunities but also on attracting 
investment from emerging Asian countries, of which China is considered 
to be an investor of growing importance. The role of Chinese capital in 
Hungary compared with the total amount of invested capital is still very 
small, but in the last few years these capital inflows have accelerated 
significantly.
Chinese investment in Hungary started to increase after the country joined 
the EU in 2004. According to Chinese statistics, a truly rapid increase 
occurred, from 0.65 million US dollars in investments in 2005 to 370.1 
million US dollars in 2010. In 2010, Hungary itself took 89% of total 
Chinese capital flow to the CEE region, and around half of the stock.6 
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Nevertheless, this amount is far greater than in the graph above, 
when taking those statistics into consideration that traced the chains 
of ownership of the companies investing, since a significant portion of 
Chinese investment is received via intermediary countries or companies, 
and therefore appears elsewhere in Chinese statistics. According to the 
Hungarian National Bank’s statistics, Chinese investment stock in Hungary 
was about 1,8 billion USD by 2017, while China Global Investment Tracker, 
a database owned by the Heritage Foundation, cites an even higher figure: 





























Source: MOFCOM/Hungarian National Bank/China Global Investment Tracker 
Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors 
in Hungary. Initially, Chinese investment has flowed mostly into 
manufacturing (specifically assembly), but over time services have 
attracted more and more investment too. For example, there are now 
branches of Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, as well as offices of some of the largest law firms in China, Yingke 
Law Firm (since 2010) and Dacheng Law Offices (since 2012). The 
major Chinese investors targeting the country are primarily interested in 
telecommunication, electronics, chemical industry, transportation and 
energy markets. 
MAIN INVESTMENT TRENDS AND PROJECTS
Although Chinese multinational companies represent a relatively small 
share of total FDI stock in Hungary, they have saved and/or created 
jobs and contributed to the economic growth of Hungary with their 
investments and exports during recent years. Furthermore, many of them 
(e.g. Lenovo, ZTE, Huawei, Bank of China) have turned their Hungarian 
businesses into European regional hubs of their activities.7
Table 1. Chinese FDI in Hungary - major characteristics
Main form of investment
Greenfield / brownfield, 
M&A, joint ventures
Main sectors Chemical, IT / ICT, electronics, 
wholesale and retail, automotive, 
banking, hotels and catering, 
logistics, real estate 
Most important Chinese 
companies
Wanhua, Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo, 
Sevenstar Electronics, BYD 
Electronics, ZMJ, Comlink, Yanfeng, 
China-CEE Fund
Company form of investors both state-owned and private
Preferred locations Central Hungary, Northern Hungary
Employees from 350 to 3000 per branch
Source: own compilation
7 Szunomár, A; Völgyi K; Matura, T: Chinese investments and financial engagement in Hungary. Working Paper Nr. 208., Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regi-
onal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2014 (available at: http://vki.hu/wp-208.pdf)
A major part of China’s FDI stock in Hungary originates from an 
investment made by the Chinese chemical company Wanhua, which 
acquired a 96% stake in the Hungarian chemical company BorsodChem 
through its Luxembourg subsidiary in 2011. This subsidiary also later 
made additional investments for the development of BorsodChem. It is 
the largest Chinese investment in CEE so far. This acquisition positioned 
Wanhua as one of the major producers of raw materials in the automotive, 
insulation, construction and furniture sectors. In addition, this investment 
was also an important sign that Wanhua had chosen Hungary as its 
regional headquarters.
In addition to Wanhua’s acquisition, additional important acquisitions have 
taken place over the past few years which affected Hungary as a result of 
foreign firms having branches already located in the country: at the end of 
2017 Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group purchased Bosch’s SEG 
Automotive Germany GmbH, the former Robert Bosch Starter Motors 
Generators Holding GmbH, while in late 2016 Midea acquired German 
KUKA with its foreign subsidiaries. Lexmark International Technology 
was also acquired by Chinese companies Apex Technology and PAG Asia 
Capital in 2016. 
The second biggest Chinese investor in Hungary, and the biggest among 
Chinese greenfield investors, Huawei, arrived in the country in 2005, 
while its European Supply Centre started its operations in 2009. The 
Centre is Huawei’s second biggest supply chain in the world and it serves 
as a production and logistics centre for 55 countries in Europe, North 
and West Africa, Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East. The company 
employs around 330 people directly (white-collar workers) out of whom 
60% are Hungarian and the rest are Chinese nationals (on Hungarian 
work permits). But indirectly (as several activities are outsourced to other 
companies), Huawei Hungary is also responsible for 2500-2700 employees 
(blue-collar workers at Foxconn, Flextronics, DHL, etc.), which is around 
3000 jobs in total. It has two factory units (assembly) in Komárom and 
Pécs, and a logistics centre in Biatorbágy. Huawei is the second largest 
Chinese investor in Hungary (after Wanhua), which serves all the top 
mobile operators (including Telenor, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom) in 
the country, that is, actually 70% of Hungarian people. Huawei engages 
in various initiatives, such as talent development programmes as well as 
establishing cooperation with universities.
Besides being a potential hub for Chinese products in the European 
Union, Chinese companies expressed their interest in several Hungarian 
infrastructure-related investment in recent years, such as plans to 
transform Szombathely airport into a major European cargo base or 
develop the infrastructure of the Debrecen airport. None of them have 
been realized so far. The project to modernize the Belgrade–Budapest 
railway is a recent example of this kind, planned under a new framework, 
China’s Belt and Road initiative. However, this hasn’t been realized yet, 
either, since it was delayed by the European Commission because of 
























Figure 4. Hungary – China trade
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3. FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING IN HUNGARY
8 “Proposal for establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union”; European Commission; 13.09.2017 (available at https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:cf655d2a-9858-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF) 
9 “EU Framewrok for FDI screening”; European Parliament; February 2019 (available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614667/
EPRS_BRI(2018)614667_EN.pdf) 
10 Brattberg, Erik, Soula, Etinne:”Is Europe Finally Pushing Back on Chinese Investments?”; The Diplomat; 14.09.2018 (available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/
is-europe-finally-pushing-back-on-chinese-investments/) 
11 The full and up-to-date text of the act is available in Hungarian at: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1800057.TV&timeshift=fffffff4&txtreferer=00000001.TXT (accessed 28 
October 2018).
As Chinese companies’ investments are likely to continue in the future, 
CEE countries are facing a dilemma between encouraging and welcoming 
it, on the one hand, and safeguarding strategic sectors and industries of 
their national economies, on the other. In the European Union, only 
14 of the 28 member states, mostly Western European countries, have 
any kind of national investment screening mechanism in place for the 
sake of allowing governments to attempt a balance between these two 
considerations. Since these mechanisms reflect national characteristics 
and vary significantly in scope and design, the European Commission 
put forward a proposal in September 2017 to regulate the matter more 
systematically by establishing a collective screening framework,8 providing 
oversight for investment projects or programs “of Union interest.”9 While 
official documents do not single out Chinese companies to justify the 
need for such protective regulation, the EU’s concerns and suspicions 
about Chinese investors nonetheless provide an important rationale for an 
effective Union-wide investment screening mechanism.10 
In this European context, the Hungarian government has passed a bill in 
parliament to establish a national investment screening procedure, which 
came into effect 1 January 2019. Act LVII of 2018 on the supervision of 
foreign investments violating the national security interests of Hungary 
introduces a mandatory review process and conditions the acquisition of 
stakes by foreign entities in strategically sensitive businesses upon prior 
approval by the relevant minister designated by government decree.11 The 
threshold for the size of the foreign stake at which the investment must be 
announced is 25% in the case of any Hungarian company, and 10% in the 
case of publicly listed Hungarian companies. In addition, if an acquisition 
by a foreign entity were to result in decisive or overwhelming influence, as 
stipulated by the Hungarian civil code, the investment is likewise subject 
to the same procedure. Economic activities under the protection of the act 
include the armaments and defence industry, the production of dual-use 
goods, the financial services industry and the banking sector, the energy 
industry, water utilities, as well as information technology. 
Upon receiving the notification of the foreign entity, the designated 
minister has 60 days to conduct an investigation in order to identify the 
ownership structure and assess the effects and implications of the planned 
investment. If extraordinary circumstances require, the 60-day period can 
be extended by an additional 60 days, potentially lengthening the review 
process to 120 days. Ultimately, the minister decides on the basis of 
whether or not the investment infringes upon Hungary’s security interests. 
In the case of a rejection, the foreign entity can appeal against it at the 
Budapest-Capital Regional Court. However, the grounds upon which the 
appeal can be made are strictly procedural, and the court cannot overturn 
the decision but can only require the minister to conduct the review 
process again. A failure to notify the minister in advance of the planned 
investment and to comply with the legal requirements of the screening 
mechanism can lead to a penalty of HUF 10 million, to be paid by the 
foreign entity. 
While the exact consequences of the act are still difficult to foresee, some 






















strengthening cooperation with China in the CEE region, yet foreign direct 
investment from Chinese companies is a modest 2.4% of the total FDI 
stock in Hungary.12 EU partners still dominate the Hungarian economy, 
with German investments amounting to roughly 25% of the total. It 
was only on 28 October 2018, at a meeting between the Prime Minister 
of Japan and his counterparts from the Visegrad 4 countries, that the 
Hungarian PM made clear that cultivating good relations with China is a 
priority in Hungarian foreign policy. In something of a diplomatic fiasco, 
the Hungarian side was unwilling to support a joint statement with critical 
references to China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, leading to a more 
neutrally-phrased version of the document that the Japanese side decided 
not to sign.13 The diplomatic charm offensive towards Beijing means 
that the new Hungarian screening mechanism is decidedly not meant to 
discourage Chinese companies from investing in the country. 
In recent years, the Hungarian government has embraced a protectionist 
and interventionist market attitude with the purpose of reducing foreign 
ownership in crucial economic sectors. Two notable examples are 
the banking sector, where allegedly excessive profits warranted the 
government’s intervention, and restrictions on the foreign purchasing of 
Hungarian farmland.14 The act on the supervision of foreign investments 
makes it possible for the government to expand its discretionary power 
over other areas of strategic significance. The review process conducted 
at the ministerial level means that the decision will be influenced by high 
political considerations, whereby factors other than national security 
are expected to affect the outcome. The lack of transparency and a 
clear definition of what constitutes an inviolable security interest for 
Hungary also inevitably exposes the process to the political preferences 
of the government.15 Ironically, even if shady ownership chains of foreign 
companies are often used to explain the need for a national screening 
mechanism, the very process by which they are disentangled and revealed 
does not promise to be any more transparent. It is also noteworthy that 
12 Szunomár, Ágnes;“Chinese economic influence in Hungary – Rhetoric versus realities”; Institute of World Economics Blog, 20.09.2018 (available at https://vilaggazdasagi.blog.
hu/2018/09/20/chinese_economic_influence_in_hungary_rhetoric_versus_realities) 
13 “Orbán miatt diplomáciai fiaskóval ért véget a V4–Japán miniszterelnöki találkozó”; Index; 24.10.2018 (available at https://index.hu/kulfold/2018/10/24/
kina_orban_japan_v4-ek_diplomaciai_fiasko/)
14 “Hungary Openess to Foreign Investment”; Export.gov; (available at https://www.export.gov/article?id=Hungary-Openness-to-Foreign-Investment) 
15 “Vajon hatékony lesz a külföldi befektetések ellenőrzése?”; 15.07.2018 (available at https://arsboni.hu/vajon-hatekony-lesz-a-kulfoldi-befektetesek-ellenorzese/)
16 “Foreign investment to be screened to protect EU countries’ strategic interests”; European Parliament; 28.05.2018 (available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/
press-room/20180528IPR04446/foreign-investment-to-be-screened-to-protect-eu-countries-strategic-interests) 
certain activities enumerated in the act have long already been tied to 
prior government approval, even if only at the level of the relevant national 
regulator rather than the minister. 
The Hungarian act also differs from the European Commission’s proposal 
in a few important ways. The EC proposal emphasizes transparency, 
non-discrimination and predictability as three key principles underlying 
the screening process. As much as the screening mechanism is intended 
to protect key economic sectors, it should also work to alleviate fears of 
foreign investors that the EU is no longer open for business. Furthermore, 
the proposal complements ordinary security considerations by adding a 
reference to public order, expanding the grounds upon which a particular 
investment plan must be screened. While the EU prides itself on being 
one of the “most open investment regimes,” third countries also often do 
not reciprocate by providing similar access to their markets for European 
investors. This state of affairs is clearly detrimental to the European Union, 
so the proposal appears to be a warning and an intervention against such 
unfair market access practices. While the Hungarian act does not concern 
itself with these considerations, it should be kept in mind that the screening 
mechanism at the level of the EU would work in tandem with those of the 
member states. The EU would essentially rely on member state reports 
about the outcome of a particular screening process, and the contribution 
of other member states and the Commission would be limited to issuing 
comments and opinions about the process. Ultimately, the right of decision 
about giving the green light to a particular project would still reside in the 
capital of the member state where the investment is planned. It should be 
noted that even though the proposal was approved on 28 May 2018 by the 
EP’s International Trade Committee,16 it has yet to take its final shape and 
therefore remains subject to changes. To our knowledge, the Hungarian 
government has yet to adopt an official position with regards to the EU’s 
proposal. 
4. CONCLUSION
Within the CEE region, Hungary’s relations with China have been unique 
in several ways. They are unique in a historic sense, since Hungary was 
one of the first countries to formally recognize China, and the Hungarian 
government started to re-establish relations with China in the early 2000s, 
well before the other CEE countries. Furthermore, they are unique in 
a political sense, since Hungarian governments, regardless of political 
orientation, have been working on developing relations with China for 
almost two decades, and Hungary was the first in the CEE region to adopt 
an official government strategy towards Asia (and China specifically): its 
“Eastern Opening policy”. Lastly, they are unique in the sense that Hungary 






















(FDI) in the region, whilst serving as a regional hub for several Chinese 
companies and hosting the biggest Chinese population in CEE. 
Indeed, Hungary has achieved good results in its economic relations with 
China over the past decade. Nonetheless, some successful deals have led 
to further – sometimes excessive – expectations, for example over Chinese 
involvement in infrastructure development. 
When searching for possible factors that make Hungary a favourable 
investment destination for China, the cost and quality of labour is to be 
considered first: a skilled labour force is available in sectors for which 
Chinese interest is growing, while labour costs are lower in Hungary 
than the EU average. In addition to the traditional macroeconomic 
factors, institutions also play a role. An interesting aspect that is inducing 
investments in CEE is institutional stability (e.g. protection of property 
rights), which is in line with the findings of Clegg and Voss,17 who argue 
that Chinese OFDI in the EU shows “an institutional arbitrage strategy” 
as “Chinese firms invest in localities that offer clearer, more transparent 
and stable institutional environments”. The role of state subsidies and 
incentives should be also mentioned here as a potential factor of attraction 
for Chinese FDI. Especially before EU membership, but also afterwards, 
governments and local authorities applied sometimes tailor-made 
incentives to attract large investors, such as customs free zones or special 
economic zones with support services, tax allowances, partial funding for 
employee training or residence visas.18 
Moreover, Hungary’s Chinese diaspora, which is an acknowledged 
attraction for Chinese FDI in the extant literature,19 is the largest among 
CEE countries. As a result, Hungary received relatively large amounts of 
FDI over the past decade and a half, and these investment flows started 
earlier than for others in CEE. Compared to other investors in the region, 
Chinese companies also seem to pay more attention to the level of political 
relations; political gestures and measures are still important in developing 
relations with China. Hungary, which is one of the major recipients of 
Chinese OFDI in the CEE region, has had historically good political 
relations with China, and they started earlier than in other CEE countries 
of the political relation.
The Hungarian national investment screening act is part of a broader 
European tendency in which the protection of sensitive industries and 
sectors is increasingly deemed to warrant a specific legal instrument in 
the form of investment screening. Making sure that much-needed foreign 
direct investment is not scared away, the Hungarian government will have 
to walk a fine line between prioritizing security considerations and those 
of the country’s economic and financial needs. The adoption of the act on 
the supervision of foreign investments is an important first step, even if the 
review process it establishes may suffer from a number of shortcomings. 
The lack of transparency, the role of the minister as chief arbiter, and the 
absence of objective criteria for interpreting national security interests, 
17 Clegg J - Voss H: Chinese overseas direct investment in the European Union, Chatham House Publications, 2012 (available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/pub-
lic/Research/Asia/0912ecran_cleg gvoss.pdf) 
18 Hungary is the only country in the region that introduced special incentive for foreign investors from outside the EU, which is a possibility to receive a residence visa when fulfilling 
the requirement of a certain level of investment in Hungary (300000 EUR)
19 Buckley Pet al.: The Determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment”, in; Voss, Hinrich; and Zhen, Ping (2007) Journal of International Business Studies, 38, pp. 499-518.
not to mention the potential loopholes yet to be discovered, all point in 
the direction of a highly politicized process whereby larger political and 
diplomatic considerations may easily overwhelm other concerns. On the 
other hand, the Hungarian government’s pro-Chinese foreign policy, as 
well as the Eastern Opening agenda, create the impression that the act 
itself was not adopted to counter or restrain China’s growing economic 
footprint in the CEE region. Therefore, the Hungarian act may prove to be 
an exception to the growing sentiment in Europe that the single biggest 
threat to our most vulnerable businesses comes from China. 
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